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Abstract
Certificateless cryptography can be considered as an intermediate solution to over-
come the issues in traditional public key infrastructure (PKI) and identity-based
public key cryptography (ID-PKC). There exist a vast number of certificateless sig-
nature (CLS) schemes in the literature; however, most of them are not efficient
enough to be utilized in limited resources environments such as Internet of things
(IoT) or Healthcare Wireless Sensor Networks (HWSN). Recently, two lightweight
CLS schemes have been proposed by Karati et al. and Kumar et al. to be employed
in IoT and HWSNs, respectively. While both schemes are claimed to be existentially
unforgeable, in this paper, we show that both these signatures can easily be forged.
More specifically, it is shown that 1) in Karati et al.’s scheme, a type 1 adversary,
considered in certificateless cryptography, can generate a valid partial private key
corresponding to any user of its choice and as a consequence, it can forge any users’
signature on any message of its choice, and 2) in Kumar et al.’s scheme, both types
of adversaries which are considered in certificateless cryptography are able to forge
any signer’s signature on an arbitrary message.
Key words: Certificateless cryptography, Cryptanalysis, Signature, Industrial
Internet of Things, Healthcare Wireless Sensor Networks.
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1 Introduction
Certificateless cryptography, introduced in 2003 by Al-riyami and Paterson
[1], can be considered as an intermediate solution to overcome the issues in
traditional public key infrastructure (PKI) and identity-based public key cryp-
tography (ID-PKC) [2]. Whereas a trusted authority is needed in traditional
PKI to bind the identity of an entity to his public key, ID-PKC requires a
trusted private key generator to generate the private keys of users based on
their identities. Therefore, the certificate management problem in the public-
key setting is actually replaced by the key escrow problem. In certificateless
cryptography, the users’ private keys are still generated with the help of a third
party, called the key generation center (KGC). However, the KGC doesn’t have
access to the final private keys generated by the users themselves (based on
some private information obtained from the KGC and some secret values cho-
sen by the users). The public key of a user is computed from the KGC’s public
parameters and some information, private to the user, and is published by the
user himself.
Regarding the security of a certificateless cryptographic scheme, two types
of adversaries are considered in the literature: a Type 1 adversary A1 who
simulates malicious ordinary users and a Type 2 Adversary A2 who simulates
a malicious KGC in a certificateless cryptographic scheme. To perform these
simulations, A1 is allowed to replace the public key of entities with other values
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of its choice and A2 is allowed to get access to the master secret key.
The first certificateless signature (CLS) scheme was proposed in [1] by Al-
Riyami and Paterson. After this seminal work, a vast number of certificateless
signature schemes were proposed such as ordinary CLS schemes [1,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10],
certificateless proxy signature schemes [11,12,13,14], certificateless aggregate
signature schemes [4,15,16,17,18,19,20], certificateless signature schemes with
designated tester [21,22], certificateless threshold signature schemes [23,24,25],
certificateless ring signature schemes [26,27], and etc. However, due to their
heavy computational costs, most of these schemes can not be applied in lim-
ited resources environments such as Internet of Things (IoT) and Healthcare
Wireless Sensor Networks (HWSN). As a consequence, new efforts have been
put forth to construct lightweight cryptographic schemes in certificateless set-
ting in order to be applicable in limited resources environments. In this regard,
recently, two lightweight certificateless signature schemes have been proposed
by Karati et al. [3] and Kumar et al. [4]. The authors of both papers claimed
that their proposed CLS schemes are existentially unforgeable. However, in
this paper, we disprove their claims and show that the CLS schemes of [3] and
[4] are both insecure. This is done by showing that:
• In Karati et al.’s CLS scheme, a type 1 adversary of certificateless cryp-
tography is able to generate a valid partial private key corresponding to
any identity of its choice and then uses this generated partial private key to
forge the signature of the corresponding user on any message of its choice.
• In Kumar et al.’s CLS scheme, both types of adversaries, considered
in certificateless cryptography, are able to violate the unforgeability of the
scheme. More precisely, 1) a type 1 adversary is able to forge any signer’s
signature on any message in this scheme as soon as it gets access to a pair
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of message and its corresponding signature of that signer, and 2) a type
2 adversary is able to forge each user’s signature on any message in this
scheme (without even requiring to see a signature of that signer).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide the
framework and the security definition of CLS schemes. In Section 3, after
reviewing the CLS scheme of [3], we provide the proof of its insecurity. Then,
the CLS scheme of Kumar et al. [4] and analysis of its security are reviewed
in Section 4. Finally, the conclusions are provided in Section 5.
2 Certificateless signature schemes
In this section, we provide the framework and the security definition of Cer-
tificateless signature schemes.
2.1 The framework
There exist three entities in a CLS scheme: a key generation center (KGC)
which helps users to generate their private keys, a signer, and a verifier. A
CLS scheme consists of six algorithms: Setup, Set-Partial-Private-Key, Set-
Secret-Value, Set-Public-Key, CLS-Sign and CLS-Verify. The details of these
algorithms are described in the following:
Setup: Performed by KGC.
• Input: The security parameter k.
• Process:
· Generates the master secret keyMSK, and the public parameters params.
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• Output: The master secret key MSK which will be secured by KGC and
the public parameters params which are published.
Set-Partial-Private-Key: Performed by KGC.
• Input: params, MSK and a user’s identity IDS.
• Process:
· Computes a partial private key DS corresponding to this user.
• Output: Partial private key DS which will be sent securely to the user with
identity IDS.
Set-Private-Key: Performed by a user S.
• Input: params and S’s partial private key DS.
• Process:
· Generates a secret value xS and computes the private key SKS by using
it and DS.
• Output: SKS which will be secured by the user S.
Set-Public-Key: Performed by a user S.
• Input: params and S’s private key SKS.
• Process:
· Computes the public key PKS.
• Output: PKS which will be published.
CLS-Sign: Performed by the user S.
• Input: params, the user’s identity IDS and his private key SKS, and a
message m.
• Process:
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· Generates a signature σ on the message m.
• Output: σ as the signature on m.
CLS-Verify: Performed by the verifier.
• Input: params, signer’s identity IDS and his public key PKS, message m
and a signature σ.
• Process:
· Checks the validity of σ.
• Output: VALID if σ is a valid signature on m and INVALID otherwise.
2.2 Security model
To call a CLS scheme secure, it should provide existentially unforgeability
against adaptive chosen-message and -identity attacks in the adversarial model
of certificateless cryptography which consists of the following two types of
adversaries:
• A type-1 adversary (A1), that has not access to the master secret key but
can replace any signer’s public key with any value of its choice.
• A type-2 Adversary (A2), that has access to the master secret key but cannot
replace public keys.
The security of a CLS scheme is modeled through the following two games
played between a challenger C and adversaries A1 or A2.
Game 1: This game, played between C and A1, consists of the following
phases:
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• Setup: In this phase, C generates the master secret keyMSK and the public
parameters params. It keeps MSK secure and sends params to A1.
• Queries: In this phase, A1 can perform a polynomially bounded number of
the following queries and C’s answers to these queries are as follows:
· Request-Partial-Private-Key (IDS): inputting IDS to this query, A1 will
get S’s partial private key DS as the output.
· Request-Secret-Value (IDS): inputting IDS to this query, A1 will get S’s
secret value xS as the output.
· Request-Public-Key (IDS): inputting IDS to this query, A1 will get S’s
public key PKS as the output.
· Replace-Public-Key (IDS, PK
′
S): inputting IDS and PK
′
S to this query,
PK ′S will be set as the public key corresponding to the user S.
· CL-Sign (IDS, m): inputting IDS and m to this query, A1 will get σ as
the output which is a valid signature of S on m.
• Output: Finally, when A1 decides to end the queries phase, it outputs a
signature σ on a message m on behalf of a targeted user with identity ID.
It wins the game if the following conditions are fulfilled:
· The algorithm CLS-Verify outputs VALID on inputs params, m, σ, ID,
and PK where, PK is the public key corresponding to the user with
identity ID.
· The queries Request-Partial-Private-Key(ID) and CL-Sign(ID,m) weren’t
queried in the queries phase.
Definition 1 A CLS scheme is Type-1 secure against the adaptively chosen-
message and -identity attack if the advantage of any polynomially bounded
adversary A1 in winning Game 1 be negligible.
Game 2: This game, played between C and A2, consists of the following
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phases:
• Setup: In this phase, C generates the master secret keyMSK and the public
parameters params and sends them to A2.
• Queries: In this phase, A2 can perform a polynomially bounded number
of queries as in Game 1 and C answers them in the same way. The only
constraint here is that A2 is not allowed to replace any public keys. Note that
A2 knows MSK and can compute the partial private key of any identity by
itself.
• Output: Finally, when A2 decides to end the queries phase, it outputs a
signature σ on a message m on behalf of a targeted user with identity ID.
It wins the game if the following conditions are fulfilled:
· The algorithm CLS-Verify outputs VALID on inputs params, m, σ, ID,
and PK where, PK is the public key corresponding to the user with
identity ID.
· The queries Request-Secret-Value(ID) and CL-Sign(ID,m) weren’t queried
in the queries phase.
Definition 2 A CLS scheme is Type-2 secure against the adaptively chosen-
message and -identity attack if the advantage of any polynomially bounded
adversary A2 in winning Game 2 be negligible.
3 Karati et al.’s CLS scheme
In this section, we first review Karati et al.’s CLS scheme and then prove that
it is completely insecure.
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3.1 Review of the scheme
The CLS scheme of Karati et al. [3] consists of the following algorithms:
Setup: Performed by KGC.
• Input: The security parameter k.
• Process:
· Generates two groups G1 and G2 with the same prime order p and an
efficient bilinear pairing e : G1 ×G1 → G2.
· Chooses a generator g1 ∈ G1.
· Chooses a cryptographic hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p .
· Chooses a random y ∈ Z∗p as his master secret key.
· Computes g2 = e(g1, g1)
y and YKGC = g
y
1 .
• Output: The master secret key y which will be secured by KGC and the
public parameters params = (G1, G2, p, e, g1, g2, YKGC, H) which will
be published.
Set-Partial-Private-Key: Performed by KGC.
• Input: params, master secret key y and a user’s identity IDi ∈ {0, 1}
∗.
• Process:
· Computes hi = H(IDi).
· Chooses ri ∈ Z
∗
p randomly and computes Ri = g
ri
1 and yi = (g1)
y·hi
hi+ri+y .
• Output: Partial private key Di = (yi, Ri) which will be sent securely to the
user with identity IDi. After receiving Di from KGC, the user considers
Di genuine if:
e(g1, YKGC)
hi = e(yi, (g
hi
1 · Ri · YKGC)). (1)
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Set-Private-Key: Performed by a user i.
• Input: params and i’s partial private key Di = (yi, Ri).
• Process:
· Chooses xi, ci ∈ Z
∗
p randomly and sets SKi = (ci, xi, Ri).
• Output: SKi which will be secured by the user i.
Set-Public-Key: Performed by a user i.
• Input: params, i’s partial private key Di = (yi, Ri) and his private key
SKi = (ci, xi, Ri).
• Process:
· Computes Yi =
(
Yi1 = (yi)
1
xi , Yi2 = g
ci
2
)
as the user’s public key.
• Output: Yi which will be published.
CLS-Sign: Performed by a user S.
• Input: params, the user’s identity IDS and his private key SKS = (cS, xS, RS)
and a message m.
• Process:
· Computes hS = H(IDS).
· Chooses a random value t ∈ Z∗p and computes
σ1 = g
t
2, (2)
σ2 =
(
ghS1 · RS · YKGC
)( cSm −t)xS
. (3)
• Output: σ = (σ1, σ2) as the signature on m.
CLS-Verify: Performed by the verifier.
• Input: params, S’s identity IDS and his public key YS = (YS1, YS2), message
m and a signature σ = (σ1, σ2).
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• Process:
· Computes hS = H(IDS).
· Checks whether
(
Y
1
m
S2
σ1
)hS
=? e (YS1, σ2) .
• Output: VALID if the above equation holds and INVALID otherwise.
3.2 Cryptanalysis of the scheme
The authors of [3] claimed that their proposed scheme is a secure certificate-
less signature scheme. However, in this section, we disprove their claim. More
specifically, we show that by accessing to a valid partial private key corre-
sponding to any user, a valid partial private key corresponding to any other
user can be generated. Thereupon, each user of this scheme can forge the sig-
nature of other users on any arbitrary message of his choice. This is formally
stated and proved in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Let S with identity IDS be an arbitrary user of Karati et al.’s
scheme. Suppose that A1 has access to a valid partial private key corresponding
to S. Then, A1 is able to generate a valid partial private key corresponding
to any other user S ′ with arbitrary identity IDS′ and as a consequence, he is
able to forge S ′’s signature on any message of his choice.
Proof. According to Set-Partial-Private-Key algorithm of Karati et al.’s CLS
scheme, the partial private key corresponding to S with identity IDS is a pair
(yS, RS) where, RS = g
rS
1 and yi = (g1)
y·hS
hS+rS+y in which rS ∈ Z
∗
p is an unknown
randomly chosen value, y is the master secret key and hS = H(IDS). In the
following, we show how A1 is able to use S’s partial private key to generate
a valid partial private key corresponding to any other user S ′ with arbitrary
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identity IDS′. To this end, A1:
(1) Computes hS′ = H(IDS′) ∈ Z
∗
p .
(2) Computes α = hS′
hS
∈ Z∗p . Note that the output of H(·) is a member of Z
∗
p
and therefore, h−1S exists in Z
∗
p .
(3) Computes yS′ = y
α
S and RS′ =
RS
g
(α−1)·hS
1
.
(4) Sets (yS′, RS′) as the partial private key corresponding to the user S
′ with
identity IDS′.
Using the following relation, it can easily be verified that (yS′, RS′) is a valid
partial private key corresponding to the user S ′ with identity IDS′:
e(yS′, (g
hS′
1 · RS′ · YKGC)) (4)
= e(yαS , (g
α·hS
1 ·
RS
g
(α−1)·hS
1
· YKGC)) (5)
= e(yαS , (g
α·hS−(α−1)hS
1 · RS · YKGC)) (6)
= e(yαS , (g
hS
1 · RS · YKGC)) (7)
= e(yS, (g
hS
1 · RS · YKGC))
α (8)
= e(g1, YKGC)
hS ·α (9)
= e(g1, YKGC)
hS′ , (10)
where, equality (9) is obtained from the fact that (yS, RS) is a valid partial
private key generated by the KGC and therefore,
e(g1, YKGC) = e(yS, (g
hS
1 · RS · YKGC)). (11)
After computing S ′’s partial private key, A1 can perform Set-Private-Key and
Set-Public-key (as explained in Katari et al.’s CLS scheme) instead of S ′ to
compute a valid pair of private and public keys corresponding to S ′. Now,
using the private key of S ′, A1 can forge S
′’s signature through CLS-Sign
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algorithm on any message of its choice. ✷
4 Kumar et al.’s CLS scheme
In this section, we first review Kumar et al.’s CLS scheme and then prove that
their scheme is forgeable.
4.1 Review of the scheme
The CLS scheme of Kumar et al. [4] consists of the following algorithms:
Setup: Performed by KGC.
• Input: The security parameter k.
• Process:
· Chooses two groups G1 and G2 with the same prime order q and a gener-
ator P in G1.
· Chooses a bilinear map e : G1 ×G1 → G2.
· Chooses a random α ∈ Z∗q as the master secret key and sets PPub = α ·P .
· Chooses cryptographic hash functions H1, H2 : {0, 1}
∗ → G1 and H3 :
{0, 1}∗ → Z∗q .
• Output: The master secret key α which will be secured by KGC and the
system parameters params = (q, G1, G2, e, P, PPub, H1, H2, H3) which
will be published.
Set-Partial-Private-Key: Performed by KGC.
• Input: params, master secret key α and a user’s identity IDi ∈ {0, 1}
∗.
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• Process:
· Computes QIDi = H1(IDi).
· Computes Di = α ·QIDi .
• Output: Partial private key Di which will be sent securely to the user with
identity IDi.
Set-Private-Key: Performed by a user i.
• Input: params and i’s identity IDi.
• Process:
· Selects a random value xi ∈ Z
∗
q as the i’s secret key.
· Sets SKi = (xi, Di).
• Output: SKi which will be secured by the user i.
Set-Public-Key: Performed by a user i.
• Input: params and i’s private key SKi = (xi, Di).
• Process:
· Computes Yi = xi · P as i’s public key.
• Output: Yi which will be published.
CLS-Sign: Performed by a user S.
• Input: params, the signer’s identity IDS, his public key YS, his private key
SKS = (xS , DS), some state information ∆ and a message m.
• Process:
· Chooses a random value r ∈ Z∗q and computes R = r · P ∈ G1.
· Computes W = H2(∆) and h = H3(m, IDS, YS, R).
· Computes V = DS + r ·W + h · xS · PPub.
• Output: σ = (R, V ) as the signature on m under the state information ∆.
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CLS-Verify: Performed by the verifier.
• Input: params, signer’s identity IDS and his public key YS, message m,
some state information ∆ and a signature σ = (R, V ).
• Process:
· Computes QIDS = H1(IDS), W = H2(∆) and h = H3(m, IDS, YS, R).
· Verifies e(V, P ) =? e(QIDS + h · YS, PPub)e(R,W ).
• Output: VALID if the above equation holds and INVALID otherwise.
4.2 Cryptanalysis of the scheme
Kumar et al. claimed that their scheme is existentially unforgeable against
adaptive chosen message attacks. However, in this section, we disprove their
claim. We prove the insecurity of Kumar et al.’s CLS scheme by the following
theorems:
Theorem 2 Let S be a signer with identity IDS who uses Kumar et al.’s CLS
scheme. Suppose that a type 1 adversary A1 has access to a tuple (m, σ =
(R, V ) ,∆), where σ is S’s signature on messagem under the state information
∆. Then, A1 is able to forge S’s signature on any new message m
′ under the
same state information ∆.
Proof. According to Kumar et al.’s CLS-Sign algorithm, the signature σ is as
follows:
R = r · P, V = DS + r ·H2(∆) + xS · h · PPub, (12)
where h = H3(m, IDS, YS, R) and r ∈ Z
∗
q is a random value that is unknown
to A1. Now, in order to forge S’s signature on a new massage m
′, A1:
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(1) Issues a Request-Secret-Value query on the input of IDS and obtains xS
as the result.
(2) Computes DS,∆ = V − xS · h · PPub = DS + r ·H2(∆).
(3) Uses DS,∆, xS and R to forge S’s signature on m
′ as follows:
1. Computes h′ = H2(m
′, IDS, YS, R) and V
′ = DS,∆ + h
′ · xS · PPub.
2. Outputs σ′ = (R, V ′) as S’s signature on message m′.
It can be easily verified that the forged signature σ′ is valid.
✷
Theorem 3 Let S be a signer with identity IDS who uses Kumar et al.’s
CLS scheme. Then, a type 2 adversary A2 is able to forge S’s signature on
any message m of its choice under any arbitrary state information ∆.
Proof. To forge S’s signature on any arbitrary message m, A2:
1. Chooses a random value r ∈ Z∗q and computes R = r · P .
2. Computes h = H3(m, IDS, YS, R) and V = DS + rH2(∆) + h · α · YS.
3. Outputs σ = (R, V ) as S’s signature on message m′.
Note that A2 acts as the malicious key generation center and has access to
partial private keys. It can be easily verified that the forged signature σ is
valid. ✷
5 Conclusion
In this paper, the security of two recently proposed lightweight certificateless
signature schemes is considered. We prove that in one of them, a type 1 adver-
sary of certificateless cryptography can forge the signature of any user on any
16
arbitrary message of his choice and in the other one, both considered types of
adversaries in certificateless cryptography can forge valid signatures on behalf
of any user on any message of their choices.
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